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Reported earnings are considered to be the most important single item in financial 
statements reported by publicly held companies. While executives have strong incentives 
for manage the earnings, International Financial Accounting Standards are being constantly 
developed in order to make reporting comparable, as well as to control the level of 
management discretion. 
 
This research studies the relationship of trust and earnings management. The objective of 
this thesis is to find out whether the level of trust in a society affects the level of earnings 
management in companies. This research uses DeFond & Park model to estimate the level 
of abnormal working capital accruals that indicate the level of earnings management. 
Regression analysis is used to find out whether either generalized trust or company trust 
have an effect on reported abnormal working capital accruals. The sample includes only 
those European listed IFRS companies operating on other than financial and insurance 
industry. The sample is also limited to specific European countries. 
 
It could be expected, based on the previous researches, that the level of earnings 
management varies between the societies with different levels of trust. In the regression 
analysis, generalized trust and company trust are selected to be the hypothesis variables that 
determine whether the hypothesis is accepted or rejected. However, this research finds that 
there is no significant correlation between trust and abnormal working capital accruals. 
Hence, the results suggest that the level of trust does not affect earnings management of 
European firms. 
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Yritysten raportoimaa tulosta pidetään listayhtiöiden kohdalla tärkeimpänä yksittäisenä 
tilinpäätöslukuna. Yrityksen johdolla on usein kovat paineet muunnella tulosta. Tämän 
vuoksi IFRS-standardeja kehitetään jatkuvasti, jotta yhtiöiden tilinpäätöksistä saataisiin 
vertailukelpoisia muun muassa hallitsemalla johdon harkinnanvaraisuuden käyttöä 
raportoinnissa. 
 
Tämä tutkimus keskittyy luottamuksen ja tuloksenohjauksen väliseen yhteyteen. 
Tutkielman tarkoituksena on selvittää, vaikuttaako yhteiskunnassa vallitseva luottamuksen 
taso yritysten tuloksenohjauksen tasoon. DeFond & Park –metodia käytetään mitattaessa 
harkinnanvaraisia jaksotuseriä, jotka kuvastavat yrityksen tuloksenohjausta. 
Regressioanalyysin avulla selvitetään, onko yleisellä luottamustasolla tai yrityksiin 
liittyvällä luottamuksella vaikutusta raportoituihin epänormaaleihin jaksotuseriin. Otos on 
rajattu kattamaan ainoastaan ne eurooppalaiset listayhtiöt, jotka raportoivat IFRS-
tilinpäätöksen, sekä toimivat muulla kuin rahoitus- ja vakuutusalalla. Otos rajoittuu lisäksi 
vain tiettyihin Euroopan maihin. 
 
Aikaisempaan kirjallisuuteen perustuen voitaisiin olettaa, että tuloksenohjauksen taso 
vaihtelee sellaisten yhteiskuntien välillä, joissa luottamustaso on eri. Regressioanalyysissä 
yleinen luottamustaso sekä yritysluottamus on valittu hypoteesimuuttujiksi, jotka 
määrittävät, hyväksytäänkö hypoteesi vai ei. Tutkimustulokset osoittavat, että 
luottamuksella ja epänormaaleilla jaksotuserillä ei ole merkitsevää yhteyttä toisiinsa. Näin 
ollen luottamuksella ei havaita olevan vaikutusta yritysten tuloksenohjauksen tasoon 
Euroopassa. 
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1 Introduction  
 
1.1 Background and motivation 
Earnings management researches have been motivated, among other aspects, by famous 
financial scandals in the early 2000s. Parmalat, an Italian multinational dairy and food 
corporation, is an example of European financial fraud scandal. The company had 
convincingly entered the financial market at the end of the 90s, but by the year 2001 it 
already faced some financial problems. The plan for a €300 million fundraising effort was 
dropped and the company was not able to repay its debts. (Wikipedia/Parmalat) 
 
During the year 2003, Parmalat’s three chief financial officers as well as the chief executive 
officer were resigned one by one. Finally, the Bank of America released a document showing 
almost €4 billion in Parmalat’s bank account as a forgery. A fraud investigation was 
followed, hundreds of thousands of investors lost their money and total of 6 executives were 
arrested. Auditors found that the company had covered-up debts amounted eight times the 
sum originally stated in balance sheets. (Wikipedia/Parmalat) 
 
Accounting standards present some limitations regarding accounting policy and accounting 
estimate choices the company can apply in bookkeeping. However, there is still space for 
management discretion when determining the financial statement numbers to be reported. 
Accounting choices may be related to inventory valuation and write-downs, depreciation 
and amortization of long-term assets, and allowance for doubtful account. (Degeorge et al. 
1999) 
 
Executives have strong incentives to manage earnings, as their bonuses and job may depend 
on the reported figures (Healy 1985 p. 106). Moreover, executives are aiming to arouse 
interest in new potential investors, while they are trying to keep the current investors 
satisfied. Stakeholders are interested in reported earnings, because they are considered even 
more important financial statement item than cash flows when determining the success of 
the company. (Degeorge et al. 1999) 
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Real life cases such as the financial scandals have revealed that companies do have various 
possibilities to manage their reported earnings. Managers have opportunities and sometimes 
incentives as well to delay recording of the expense or making a large investment. However, 
Healy and Wahlen (1998) state that even though it is generally known that earnings 
management do exist, it is difficult for researchers to provide convincing evidence. 
 
Olivera (2015) studied trust in European countries. There are differences in the level of trust 
in different countries, and Nordic countries are found to represent higher level trust than 
other European countries. Generalized trust can be seen as trust that is expressed to 
individuals one does not know across society. This reflects how much uncertainty and 
concern exists in the society between different people. 
 
Knechel et al. (2018) studied the relationship between generalized trust and audit fees in 
their recent study. They found out that the effect of trust on earnings management is 
dependent on the society that is being examined; the positive impact of societal trust and 
audit fees is not as strong in countries with greater levels of investor protection. These 
findings are really fascinating, being one of the main motivations for this study. 
 
Earnings Management has been a popular subject for researches during the past years. The 
phenomenon has aroused interest among researchers, and various studies have been made 
regarding the subject. Popular topics include the quality of financial information as well as 
the effectiveness of accounting standards. There are some studies about the effect of culture 
on earnings management (e.g. Nanda & Wysocki, 2013). However, there are no studies 
regarding the relationship between the trust in a society and the level of earnings 
management in European context.  
 
Moreover, this study uses also the variable company trust in the tests, while previous 
researches have focused on the term generalized trust. Company trust indicates the level of 
trust the individuals have towards the firms in a society (World Values Survey, 2014). For 
these reasons, the results of this research may be valuable to the investigation of earnings 
management. 
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1.2 Objectives and research question 
 
The objective of this research is to find out whether the level of trust in a society affects the 
level of earnings management in companies within that society. This study examines the 
generalized trust and company trust to find out whether either of these variables have an 
effect on abnormal working capital accruals that indicate the earnings management. 
 
This study presents a research question: Does the level of generalized trust or company trust 
in a society affect the level of earnings management in companies? 
 
 
1.3 Scope and limitations  
 
As with every empirical study, this research is subject to a number of limitations. Firstly, 
only those listed companies that report IFRS financial statements are taken into account in 
order to keep the research comparable. Secondly, this research focuses only on companies 
within Europe so the results do not necessarily apply to other continents. 
 
In this thesis, the DeFond and Park model is used to detect the level of discretionary accruals. 
This research does not take a stand on the question whether a different model could have 
brought out a different result. Due to the subject’s definition regarding IFRS-adopters as 
well as the locational and industrial criteria, the sample size includes 3,680 companies. 
However, it can be considered to be reasonably representative sample of the population. 
 
Like any other research, this thesis required subjective estimation regarding the formation 
of the sample according to the World Values Survey’s (2014) research, and the selection of 
the sample among variety of companies and industries. Also control variables in regression 
analysis are determined based on previous researches and author’s discretion. Different 
sample and variable choices could have affected the final results of this study. 
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1.4 Structure of research 
 
In the next chapter, the previous literature will be introduced and interesting aspects of 
earnings management are discussed. The term earnings management is explained, and the 
motivation as well as different ways to manage earnings are discussed. The chapter 2 will 
familiarize the reader with the specifies of earnings management and the effects of culture 
and trust on the issue. The chapter also introduces some models for measuring the level of 
earnings management. Hypothesis is developed in the end of chapter 2.  
 
Chapter 3 describes the methodology of this study. The chapter starts with disclosing how 
hypothesis will be tested, after which the data collection process is explained. Regression 
model as well as the variables are discussed and justified. Chapter 3 also estimates the 
appropriateness of the data and method used in this study. Chapter 4 goes through the steps 
of the analysis process. The empirical results from the regression model are presented, and 
the findings are analyzed. The empirical findings of this study are compared to the ones 
discussed in previous literature. Findings and conclusions are discussed more detail in 
chapter 5, as final chapter assesses the importance of findings. Chapter 5 raises some 
limitations of this study as well as discussed the suggestions for the further research. 
 
The empirical tests are conducted using logistic regression analysis. The analysis includes 
scaled abnormal working capital accruals, which are determined by using DeFond & Park 
model. Research sample of 3,680 is selected by choosing companies that fulfill the following 
requirements; 1) Publicly listed company, 2) Locates in specific European country, and 3) 
Operates in other than financial and insurance -industry. Financial statement information is 
collected using Thomson Reuters Eikon -platform, while generalized and company trust 
values are determined by World Value Survey (2014). 
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2 Literature review  
 
In this chapter, the previous literature regarding earnings management is presented. Chapter 
2 explains the earnings management concept and discusses the reasons as well as patterns to 
manage earnings. Literature review goes also through the terms Real Earnings Management 
and Accrual-based Earnings Management, discussing also about the acceptability of 
earnings management. Chapter 2 goes through the previous literature regarding the 
relationship of culture and earnings management. Three earnings management estimation 
models are introduced, and the hypothesis is developed in the end of this chapter.  
 
 
2.1 Earnings management  
 
According to Sincerre et al. (2016), earnings management can be seen as freedom of 
measuring company accounting results. Scott (2003, p. 368-369), instead, states that 
earnings management occurs when one selects accounting policies from a set of accepted 
accounting rules in order to get favorable results. 
 
Healy & Wahlen (1998) determine the term earnings management as follows: “Earnings 
management occurs when managers use judgement in financial reporting and in structuring 
transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the 
underlying economic performance of the company, or to influence contractual outcomes that 
depend on reported numbers.”  
 
2.1.1 Why are earnings manipulated? 
 
Initially, earnings management arises from the flexibility in accruals accounting that allows 
managers to use discretion in order to improve decision usefulness of financial statements 
(Subramanyam and Wild 2009, p. 108). According to Healy and Wahlen (1998), motivations 
for earnings management are arising from (1) capital market expectations and valuation, (2) 
contracts that include terms related to accounting numbers, and (3) government regulation. 
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The stakeholders of publicly held firms, such as investors, analysts, senior executives and 
board of directors consider earnings to be single most important item in the reported financial 
statements. Other items including dividends, capital investments and cash flow are showed 
to have only a marginal correlation in Return On Equity numbers (Easton, Harris and Ohlson 
1992; Kothari and Sloan 1992). Again, Dechow (1994) found that current earnings better 
predict the future cash flows than current cash flows do. 
 
Investors rely on the information published by companies. To make investors more 
interested in the company, executives may manage earnings in order to make the company 
to look more desirable. It is known that managing earnings is only a short-term solution, 
since up warding earnings today will decrease them on the following years. However, 
executive’s time horizon is relatively short because the value of the stock is the present value 
of dividends stretching to infinity. Hereby executives have an incentive to boost the current 
earnings at the expense of future. (Healy 1985) 
 
Executives are monitored by directors, investors, suppliers and customers, which makes 
them likely to act in self-interest and have strong incentives to manage earnings (Degeorge 
et al. 1999). This is because the rewards given to senior executives depend on the earnings 
achieved on their watch (Healy 1985). Ultimately, earnings and stock price performance 
affect executive’s probability of keeping his job (Healy 1985; Gaver, Gaver and Austin 
1995). Accordingly, an executive may not accept lower earnings today even if it would result 
in substantially higher returns tomorrow.  
 
Certain thresholds may be used in executive’s personal compensation contracts but also in 
the firm’s lending contracts. When earnings are close unacceptable threshold, executives 
have a significant incentive to manage them upward. However, earnings are not necessarily 
managed upwards: if executive is already likely to earn a maximum bonus due to high 
earnings, further earnings increases are shifted forward in order to make future thresholds 
easier to meet (Healy 1985 p. 106). Executives may not want to report large increases in 
earnings because of the risk that their performance target will be lifted up. 
 
Regulatory motivations are related to industry regulations, investigation by anti-trust 
regulators or tax planning purposes. Some industries, such as banking and insurance, face 
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regulatory monitoring that focuses on accounting data. Therefore, banks for instance, are 
obliged to maintain sufficient amount of capital, which causes incentives to manage earnings 
upward. On the other hand, firms that are vulnerable to an anti-trust investigation may want 
to manage earnings to appear less profitable. This is also the case in tax planning. (Healy & 
Wahlen 1998) 
 
2.1.2 Earnings management patterns 
 
There are several strategies that can be used to manage earnings. The Cookie jar reserve is 
a method were managers try to smooth the reported numbers throughout different years by 
increasing or decreasing earnings. The strategy gets its name from the activity where part of 
earnings in the good years are reserved (into a cookie jar) and recorded into bad years in 
order to achieve more stable income between financial years (Thi, 2015). Moreover, revenue 
recognition may be used to manage earnings. Managers may execute this by creating fake 
revenue or changing time in recording with premature recognition or deferred revenue 
recognition. (Thi 2015) 
 
If a company is going to report a bad result and low earnings, manager may want to record 
even more expenses resulting even worse outcome. This is because in the following years, 
earnings will be less burdened by those expenses. The strategy is called Big bath, and it 
typically happens at the last quarter reports. At that time managers have a picture of financial 
year’s performance and are able to tell whether the company is going to reach the earnings 
expectation. Judgement may be used by choosing specific income-decreasing accruals in 
order to affect financial statement numbers such as write-offs and deferred revenue (Healy, 
1985). According to Nikolai et al. (2010, pg. 513), impairment loss on long-term asset is the 
most common expense used in big bath strategy. 
 
Fourth earnings management strategy takes place when a company acquires another firm to 
manage financial statement numbers. Acquired company’s earnings may be integrated into 
parent company’s consolidated earnings to boost income. Also the expenses, such as R&D 
costs of the acquired company may be used at acquisition year to reduce burden for future 
earnings. This technique is called Creative acquisition accounting (Thi 2015) or, according 
to McKee (2005), Big bet on the future. The name indicates that by acquiring another 
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company, the firm may affect significantly to its revenue and costs. By recognizing more 
costs in current year, the future years have a better expected result. 
 
 
2.1.3 Real earnings management 
 
According to Scott (2009, p. 403), real earnings management occurs when managers take 
actions to affect earnings in order to achieve certain objectives related to the reported 
numbers. Previous literature (e.g., Bange and De Bondt 1998; Rowchowdhury 2006) 
introduces various methods to manage earnings through deviations from normal business 
activities. According to Xu et al. (2007), these methods are categorized as deviations from 
operating and investing activities, and deviations from financing activities. 
 
Deviation related to operating and investing activities in this context could include, for 
instance, affecting the level of discretionary expenditures, such as research and development 
expenditures (R&D). According to IFRS standards, research and advertising costs, and 
usually also development costs are expensed in the period in which they occur (IASB 1998, 
IAS no. 38). Consequently, these costs affect the income of that financial year, which means 
that postponing of investments or projects can increase earnings. Moreover, larger 
production and price reductions are examples of operating activities, which may boost sales. 
If a firm sells its fixed assets with a gain, it increases earnings as well. Therefore, firms have 
several ways to manage earnings by using their operating and investing activities. 
(Rowchowdhury 2006) 
 
According to Bruns and Merchant (1996), direct management can be done through delaying 
maintenance expenditures or training. Firm may also boost sales or cut prices in order to 
increase income. Direct management of earnings has real consequences and it may cause 
costs in a long-term period. 
 
Companies could affect their earnings with financing activities using stock options or 
acquiring financial instruments. Granting stock options decreases earnings per share (EPS) 
as the number of shares grows. On the other hand, repurchasing of stocks increases EPS 
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(Hribar et al. 2006; Bens et al. 2003). When acquiring financial instruments, firms hedge 
themselves from earnings decreases (Hand 1989). 
 
Despite the fact that real activities are an interesting subject, this thesis focuses on accrual-
based earnings management and the measurement of discretionary accruals. Next chapter 
describes how accruals can be used in managing earnings.  
 
2.1.4 Accrual-based earnings management 
 
Experts state that accrual-based accounting is able to provide a better understanding of a 
company’s financial performance than cash-basis accounting. Accruals are used in order to 
present expenses and revenues in the period when they actually incur. Hence, the objective 
of accruals is to show the true performance of the company.  
 
In addition to this, accruals can be used to manage earnings. Accrual-based earnings 
management occurs at the time of financial statement preparation, when accounting principle 
choices and manager discretion are typically involved (Kothari et al. 2012). Managers may 
manipulate reported income when they are recording accruals for events, because these 
events usually require discretion in accounting standards. Events that include discretion 
include for example losses from bad debts and asset impairments. (Healy and Wahlen 1998)  
     
According to Bruns and Merchant (1996, p. 25), firms may have flexibility in the choice of 
allowance for bad debt, inventory methods, expensing research and development, 
capitalization of leases, estimation for pension liabilities and so on. These are examples of 
events were manager discretion is required.  However, accounting standards may limit the 
options used when recording these events. As executives have both the incentive and the 
ability to manage earnings, IFRS standards are considered to diminish accrual-based 
earnings management in companies. 
 
2.1.5 REM vs. AEM 
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Real earnings management (REM) and accrual-based earnings management (AEM) are both 
ways to manage earnings. According to Zang (2012), firms prefer one earnings management 
strategy compared to other depending on the costs of these strategies. The costs of applying 
REM are affected by the economic consequences that result from deviating from optimal 
business activities. Restrictions related to AEM, instead, are related to auditors’ scrutiny and 
firm’s accounting flexibility (Becker et al. 1998).  
 
According to Zang (2012), real earnings management requires companies to use their real 
activities to change the financial numbers. This is why REM costs more to firms, and it could 
negatively affect firm value in the long run. However, managers tend to engage in REM 
when firm is facing more investor protection, since the manipulation of accruals is not 
possible. 
 
Joosten (2012) concludes that companies facing more industry competition and / or financial 
distress are likely to use accrual-based management to meet the thresholds. Interesting 
finding of his study is also that European listed firms reporting 0-10% earnings growth are 
likely to engage in real activities to manage earnings downwards. This is also the case in the 
situations where company’s tax rate is high. Joosten (2012) also finds that as accrual-based 
earnings management is being used at the end of financial year to meet the thresholds, 
European listed firms may be using REM and AEM as substitutes.  
 
Unlike real activities, accrual-based earnings management does not have cash-flow 
consequences in firm’s earnings. According to Kothari et al. (2012), real earnings 
management is more difficult to detect than accrual-based earnings management, since real 
activities require managers’ decision-making regarding operating and investing strategies, 
which affects cash flows. Therefore, this study concentrates on detecting accrual-based 
earnings management using models found by previous researches. 
 
2.1.6 Acceptable management or misleading reporting? 
 
Earnings management may be used to give a better view of company’s performance, or to 
manipulate earnings in order to show favorable results in financial statements. When this is 
the case, one could raise a question: Is earnings management good or bad? According to 
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Healy’s and Wahlen’s (1998) definition presented above, earnings management is seen as a 
sign of illegal earnings manipulation. 
 
Whether the earnings management is done in an acceptable or non-acceptable manner, it has 
consequences. According to Cupertino (2013), shareholders may value the company wrong, 
if they cannot notice the effect of earnings management in financial statements. Direct 
management actually shifts income over time. Misreporting, instead, relocates an amount 
from one year to another. One example of misreporting could be a failure to mark down 
obsolescent inventory. Misreporting must pass through accountants, so it may require 
misleading activities as well as weak internal controls. (Degeorge et al. 1999) 
 
Dechow and Skinner (2000) introduce a distinction that is presented in Figure 1 below. It 
divides earnings management based on how it is being conducted. Accounting choices and 
real cash flow choices are separated from each other. Accounting choices are further divided 
into “acceptable” (within GAAP) and “non-acceptable” (violates GAAP) means. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Literature review 12  
 
 
Figure 1 – The Distinction between Fraud and Earnings Management 
 
 
 
 
According to Dechow and Skinner (2000), overly aggressive recognition of provisions is 
seen as conservative accounting. Conservative accounting emphasizes costs and provisions, 
while sales and other income are being recognized more prudently. On the other hand, 
aggressive accounting may lead to underestimation of provisions. 
 
However, it can be questioned whether this allocation is still valid: auditors may consider 
the understatement of provisions for bad debts as fraud or an error in financial statements 
rather than acceptable earnings management. This is because IFRS-standards require 
financial assets to be recognized in the amount of expected credit loss, and this loss should 
be recorded as soon as the matter is known. (IFRS 9) 
 
Healy & Wahlen (1998) discussed the difference between acceptable and non-acceptable 
earnings management. It is challenging if not impossible to find out, when the judgement in 
financial reporting is used to improve communication, and when it is used for other purposes. 
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It is also debated whether stakeholders can see through earnings management, or are they 
failing to detect it. 
 
 
2.2 The effect of culture and trust on earnings management  
 
2.2.1 Does culture affect earnings management? 
 
The culture plays an important role in a society because it shapes economic institutions and 
financial markets (Beck et al. 2003; Stulz and Williamson 2003; Licht et al. 2005; Guiso et 
al 2006; Guiso et al 2009). There are several researches that have examined the relation 
between earnings management and Hofstede’s (1980, 1991) cultural variables. The results 
of these studies (see, for example, Guan et al. 2006 and Desender et al. 2007) are mixed. 
One problem is that the metrics of Hofstede (1980) were developed as early as in the 1970s, 
which has been criticized. Tang and Koveos (2008) however, created updated values of the 
Hofstede’s (1980, 1991) cultural variables. 
 
Callen et al. (2010) examined the effect of culture and religion on earnings management. 
They argued that if earnings management is primarily done for executives’ own benefit, then 
religious beliefs should be expected to reflect managers’ incentives to manage earnings. 
Religion plays an important role in society’s culture, and usually religions consider 
manipulation to be undesirable. 
 
Overall, they found that religiosity and earnings management are unrelated. Nonetheless, the 
cultural metrics of individualism and uncertainty avoidance seemed to affect earnings 
management.  Individualism is significantly negatively related to earnings management. 
Uncertainty avoidance and earnings management, on the other hand, are positively related.  
(Callen et al. 2010) 
 
Stack and Kposowa (2006) investigated the relation between religiosity and tax fraud 
acceptance. Their results show that religiosity and tax fraud acceptability are negatively 
related. Richardson (2008) found that uncertainty avoidance and tax evasion are positively 
related, while religion and individualism are negatively related with tax evasion. 
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Guan et al (2006) discovered that there is a positive relation between earnings management 
and both individualism and long-term orientation. Countries with uncertainty avoidance 
instead, are less likely to manage earnings. Han et al (2010) found similar results in their 
study. Desender et al (2007) however, found somewhat different results. They found that 
individualism and earnings management are negatively related. 
 
2.2.2 Societal trust  
 
Societal trust can be seen as people’s tendency to trust other people (Williamson 1993). 
Generalized trust means trust in people with whom the individual does not have a direct 
contact. World Value Survey (WVS) has measured the generalized trust in different 
countries. Trust scores calculated by World Value Survey reflect the possibility that a 
dropped wallet will be returned to its owner, and more general, that people will do the right 
thing. It has been noticed that societal trust scores do not vary significantly between years 
within a country. (Bjørnskov 2007) 
 
With high trust levels, it is more likely to develop effective financial markets. This is because 
trust enables efficient transmission of information as well as smaller transaction costs, which 
leads to trade exchange (Knack and Keefer 1997). According to Kim et al. (2012), IFRS 
adoption likely increases the credibility of financial reporting. Therefore, IFRS standards 
could affect also the role of trust in equity markets. On the other hand, Ball et al. (2015) state 
that IFRS adoption may result in inefficiency in debt markets. 
 
Nanda and Wysocki (2013) studied the relationship of societal trust and financial reporting. 
They find that firms in high trust counties are less likely to use earnings management. These 
companies also easier recognize unfavorable events in financial statements, and they place 
greater value on management disclosures. Lee et al. (2013) get similar results documenting 
that in high societal trust countries, corporate tax avoidance is lower than in countries with 
low trust. Further, Pevzner et al. (2015) detected that in higher trust countries, the investor 
reaction to companies’ announcements was stronger.  
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Knechel et al (2018) studied the relationship between cultural attributes such as societal trust 
and audit fees in different countries. They find that the impact of societal trust on audit fees 
depends on the level of investor protection. In contrast to other recent studies (e.g., Jha and 
Chen, 2015), Knechel et al (2018) document positive relation between local trust and audit 
fees. 
 
Olivera (2015) studied trust in European societies during the period 2002-2012. He found 
that Nordic countries represent higher level trust than other European countries and the US. 
In general, individuals in developing countries are less trusting than people in developed 
countries. According to Olivera (2015), generalized trust can be seen as trust that is 
expressed to individuals one does not know across society. This reflects how much 
uncertainty and concern exists in the society about different people. Particularized trust is 
expressed to individuals that belong to the same close group. This group may consist of 
family or friends, for example. Individuals may have significant trust on their close group, 
while only little generalized trust is expressed to other citizens. 
 
Olivera (2015) shows the regression for the distribution of generalized trust in 22 European 
countries (see the figure 2 below). The regressions compare the trust in years 2002 and 2012, 
which describe the years before and after the financial crisis. For some countries, the initial 
year is 2004 and the latter year is 2010. It is interesting to see that in certain countries such 
as Slovakia, the trust distribution is different in the years 2004 and 2012, whereas in Finland 
the distribution has remained similar. I wider distribution figure indicates that the opinions 
about trust vary within a society. In the case of Slovakia, the peak of the pattern was shaper 
in year 2004 than in year 2012. This could mean that the opinions about trust were more 
consistent before the financial crisis.  
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Figure 2 – Distribution of trust by country in extreme years 
 
 
Note: In the case of Estonia, Iceland and Slovakia, the initial year is 2004; and in the case 
of Greece and Istrael, the final year is 2010. 
 
Olivera (2015) found that individuals who are male, younger, more educated, single, richer 
or more religious, are more trustful. On the other hand, an individual that belongs to a 
minority ethnic group in a country is likely to be less trustful. Olivera (2015) also found that 
being a victim of a crime is negatively associated to trust. Most importantly, Olivera’s (2015) 
results showed that income inequality and the level of trust are negatively related. It indicates 
that in countries with lower levels of trust, the income inequality is more common. 
 
 
2.3 Measuring earnings management  
 
Managers are able to use reporting discretion to manage the economic performance of the 
firm. They may have incentives to overstate earnings in order to reach a target (Leuz, Nanda 
and Wysocki, 2003). The level of discretionary accruals measures the extent to which 
managers use judgement in reporting earnings. Previous researches introduce various 
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models for estimating discretionary accruals. The most popular one is considered to be Jones 
(1991) model. It estimates the effect of changes in a company’s economic circumstances on 
non-discretionary accruals. (Dechow et al. 1995) 
 
Second method for estimating discretionary accruals was introduced by Dechow and Dichev 
(2002), and it uses cash flow to estimate working capital accruals. Third accounting model 
presented in this study is DeFond & Park (2001) model. It estimates unusual accruals as 
changes in sales and working capital. 
 
Companies’ accruals have been examined already on 1980’s, and since the understanding 
towards different methods has become more common. Different models that estimate the 
discretionary accruals (such as Jones 1991, Dechow 1995, Dechow & Dichev 2002, Defond 
& Park 2001) have successfully been able to discover different kinds of earnings 
management. (Rove, 2017) 
 
However, estimation of discretionary accruals is subject to some limitations. Methods are 
unable to show which discretionary accruals are related to earnings management and which 
are necessary in order to give a true and fair view of firm’s performance. Ball (2013) 
criticized the fact that discretionary accruals are used too widely in earnings management 
literature. According to Ball (2013), literature gives the impression that earnings 
management is more common than it actually is, and that managing earnings is always 
unacceptable. 
 
Next, three models detecting earnings management are represented. 
 
2.3.1 Jones model 
 
Jones (1991) model investigates how changes in company’s economic circumstances affect 
the non-discretionary accruals. In this model, the non-discretionary accruals consist of total 
assets, gross property plant and equipment (PPE) and gross revenue. The revenue represents 
economic events that cause current non-discretionary accruals, and gross PPE controls 
depreciation expense –related non-discretionary accruals (Beslic et al. 2015). That part of 
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total accruals which cannot be explained with the changes in sales and PPE, belongs to 
discretionary accruals. 
 
There are two assumptions where Jones (1991) model is based on. Firstly, sales are expected 
to be unmanaged. Secondly, changes in current assets and liabilities are due to fluctuations 
in sales revenue. Hence, this model does not assume that non-discretionary accruals are 
constant. One specific feature of Jones (1991) model also is that it attempts to measure the 
effect of changes in operating performance on the non-discretionary accruals. (Beslic et al. 
2015) 
 
Jones (1991) divides total accruals into their discretionary (managed) and non-discretionary 
components. First, total accruals (TA) are estimated using balance sheet approach. Next, the 
model is used in order to calculate the non-discretionary accruals (NDA). Finally, 
discretionary accruals (DA) are estimated using equation DAit = TAit - NDAit. 
 
In the Jones (1991) model all variables are scaled with average total assets in the beginning 
of the year (A(t-1+t)/2) to reduce heteroscedasticity. The Jones model is the equation: 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑡
𝐴(𝑡−1+𝑡)/2
= 𝛽0 ∗
1
𝐴𝑡−1+𝑡
2
+ 𝛽1 ∗ (
ΔREV𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1+𝑡
2
) + 𝛽2 ∗ (
𝑃𝑃𝐸𝑖𝑡
𝐴𝑡−1+𝑡
2
) + 𝜀𝑖𝑡;   (1) 
 
Where: 
TAit = total accruals for the company i in the current period t; 
A(t-1+t)/2 = average total assets; 
β0, β1, β2 = estimated parameters or regression coefficients; 
εit = residual variable or earnings management (EM); 
ΔREVit = change in net sales revenues of the company i in the current year t compared with 
previous year t-1; 
PPEit = gross value property, plant and equipment for the company i in the current year t. 
 
There are various ways to determine total accruals. The two most used methods among the 
researchers are the balance sheet approach (see Healy, 1985 and Jones, 1991) and the cash 
flow approach (Chen et al. 2005; Naveed et al. 2012; Fawzi, 2014). The cash flow approach 
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uses cash flow statement to define the accruals. In this approach, total accruals may be 
calculated as follows: TAit (total accruals) = NIit (net income) – CFOit (net operating cash 
flow) (Hribar & Collins, 2002). 
 
In the balance sheet approach, the accruals are calculated as the changes in balance sheet 
accounts. Total accruals (TA) are calculated using the equation: 
 
𝑇𝐴𝑡 = Δ𝐶𝐴𝑡 − Δ𝐶𝐿𝑡 − Δ𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡 + Δ𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑡 − 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑡;    (2) 
 
Where: 
ΔCAt = Change in current assets between current year t and previous year t-1; 
ΔCLt = Change in current liabilities between current year t and previous year t-1; 
 ΔCasht = Change in cash and cash equivalents between current year t and previous year t-
1; 
ΔSTDt = Change in current maturities of long-term debt and other short term debt included 
in current liabilities between current year t and previous year t-1; 
DEPt = Depreciation and amortization in the current year t. 
 
Models that attempt to detect the manipulation of earnings, measure the amount of 
discretionary accruals for the financial year. If the value significantly differs from zero, there 
has been manipulation of the financial results in the period. Plus-sign in discretionary 
accruals means that the financials are managed to increase earnings, while minus-sign shows 
that manipulation has been done to decrease the financial result. As in every estimation 
model, there are some limitations regarding Jones model; it does not reveal the potential 
manipulation of earnings (Beslic et al. 2015) 
 
 
2.3.2 Dechow & Dichev model 
 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) present earnings management model that is not dependent on 
Jones (1991) model. The earlier is based on the assumption that accruals recorded in the 
previous or following financial period should affect those cash flows. If not, the accruals 
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have not been based on the real cash flow, which means that the quality of working capital 
accruals is compromised. (Dechow and Dichev, 2002) 
 
Similar to Jones (1991) model, Dechow and Dichev (2002) model is estimated separately to 
each company. However, no industry distribution, such like in Jones (1991) model, is being 
used. The residual variable is comparable between different companies, but it only tells 
about the deviation regarding accruals of a single company. 
 
Δ𝑊𝐶𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡−1
𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑔
+ 𝛽2 ∗
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡
𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑔
+ 𝛽3 ∗
𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑡+1
𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑣𝑔
+ 𝜀;  (3) 
 
Where: 
ΔWCt = Scaled working capital accruals; 
CFOt-1 = Operating cash flow in previous period; 
CFOt = Operating cash flow in current period; 
CFOt+1 = Operating cash flow in the following period; 
taavg = Average total assets during the period; 
ε = Deviation from estimated working capital accruals. 
 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) present the following formula for calculating the working capital 
accruals (ΔWCt): 
 
Δ𝑊𝐶𝑡 =
(Δ𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡−Δ𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡)−(Δ𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡−Δ𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑖𝑡)
𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡−1
 ;     (4) 
 
Where variables are the same as in the formulas (2) and (3). 
 
 
2.3.3 Defond & Park model 
 
Defond and Park (2001) represent a model that is used to estimate abnormal working capital 
accruals. Where this model differs from the previous models is that Defond & Park model 
explains discretionary accruals with the annual changes in sales and working capital. The 
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data needed for the model is easily accessible, and no industry allocation is required when 
applying DeFond & Park model. (Rove 2017) 
 
Theoretically, DeFond & Park model assumes that the relation of working capital and sales 
remains the same: WCt/REVt = WCt-1/REVt-1.  
 
If WCt = (WCt-1/REVt-1) * REVt, the change in accruals is normal, not discretionary, 
according to DeFond and Park (2001). However, this is not normally the case, and with 
formatting the formula, the final function that estimates the level of earnings management is 
as follows: 
 
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 =
𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡 − [(
𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡−1
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1
) ∗ 𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡]
𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡−1
       (5) 
 
Where: 
AWCAit = Scaled abnormal accruals; 
WCit = Working capital excluding cash in current period; 
WCit-1 = Working capital excluding cash in previous period; 
REVit = Revenue in current period; 
REVit-1 = Revenue in previous period; 
tait-1 = Total assets in previous period. 
 
Positive abnormal accruals mean that accruals are used to increase earnings, while negative 
results indicate that accruals are used to decrease earnings. The absolute value of the result 
tells about the intensity of earnings management. (DeFond and Park, 2001) 
 
Compared to Jones model, DeFond & Park model may give less exact results since there are 
no regression analysis or industry terms to soften the normal variation of accruals. DeFond 
& Park model is most effective in such researches that examine the level and direction of 
earnings management but the exact value of earnings management would be less significant. 
This model is chosen to be used in this study because the data needed is easily accessible. 
The sample does not have to be divided according to industries, which allows a large sample 
size. Moreover, Rove (2017) document that in his research about different earnings 
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management estimation models, DeFond & Park model is the best model to estimate the 
level of earnings management in Finnish context. Therefore, it could work well in European 
context. 
 
 
2.4 Hypothesis development 
 
Olivera’s (2015) study is only one of few researches regarding social trust in European 
context. Furthermore, as previous researches about culture and earnings management have 
showed mixed results, it is challenging to develop a framework that could predict the effects 
of specific cultural variables (trust) on earnings management in this study. Hypothesis of 
this study is developed below. 
 
Nanda and Wysocki (2013) studied the relationship of societal trust and financial reporting. 
They find a negative relationship between earnings management and societal trust. That is, 
the more there is trust in a society, the less companies use earnings management. In addition, 
Lee (2013) finds that in high societal trust countries, corporate tax avoidance is lower than 
in countries with lower societal trust. This result is comparable with earnings management 
researches, because tax avoidance can be seen as part of earnings management. For example, 
Frank et al. (2009) document a strong and positive relation between aggressive tax and 
financial reporting. Also Chen et al. (2012) find tax planning and earnings quality to be 
connected. Consequently, these researches document a negative relationship between 
societal trust and the level of earnings management. 
 
Martinez and Moraes (2016) study the relationship between auditors’ fees and earnings 
management in Bralizian market. They find a positive relationship between abnormal audit 
fees and discretionary accruals, that is, estimated level of earnings management. Knechel et 
al. (2018) also document results related to audit fees. In their study about generalized trust 
and audit fees, they find positive relation between local trust and audit fees. This indicates 
that in countries with high levels of trust, also the audit fees should be larger. According to 
these two studies, audit fees rise hand in hand with trust as well as earnings management. 
Hence, trust and earnings management should have a positive correlation as well. 
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As discussed above, previous researches document mixed results regarding the relationship 
of trust and earnings management. The hypothesis of this study is based on the results of 
these previous studies. Nanda’s and Wysocki’s (2013) research clearly supports the relation 
of trust and earnings management. However, in this research is it irrelevant whether the 
correlation is positive or negative. Hypothesis assumes that the trust is related with earnings 
management. More specifically, generalized trust and company trust are related with the 
earnings management.  
 
H1: Generalized trust and company trust are related with a firm’s earnings management.  
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3 Methodology  
 
This chapter describes the methodology of the research. Chapter 3 discusses the data sources 
as well as the reliability and validity of the data and research method. The sample 
composition is presented more detail, after which the regression equation and variables are 
introduced.  
 
3.1 Hypothesis testing 
 
Based on the hypothesis development in previous chapter, hypothesis is defined as 
“Generalized trust and company trust are related with a firm’s earnings management “. This 
research tests hypothesis by studying whether the generalized trust or company trust values 
affect the level of abnormal working capital accruals. The results are expected to show that 
generalized and company trust variables are statistically significant in predicting the amount 
of abnormal working capital accruals in European context. 
 
 
3.2 Data collection process  
 
This research uses two data sources: Country-specific trust levels are determined in World 
Values Survey (2014), while financial statement data is retrieved using Thomson Reuters 
Eikon -platform. In World Values Survey (2014), each country has individual general trust 
and company trust indexes. In chapter 2, the terms trust and societal trust are used to describe 
general trust in a society. Generalized trust measures to what extent people can be trusted in 
a certain society (Olivera, 2015). The term company trust means the level of confidence 
people have in companies (World Values Survey, 2014). Table 1 below represents the 
generalized trust and company trust values found by WVS. 
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Table 1 - Country-specific trust values (World Values Survey, 2014) 
 
Country Generalized trust Company trust 
Denmark 0,76 0,78 
Norway 0,75 0,7 
Sweden 0,67 0,67 
Netherlands 0,63 0,64 
Finland 0,62 0,61 
Germany 0,41 0,53 
Ireland 0,38 0,6 
Austria 0,37 0,58 
Belgium 0,35 0,57 
U.K. 0,35 0,57 
Italy 0,3 0,5 
France 0,24 0,57 
Spain 0,23 0,48 
Greece 0,21 0,35 
Portugal 0,17 0,44 
 
 
The data collection process starts with the country-specific trust values determined by World 
Values Survey (2014). This research examines only IFRS-adopter companies in order to 
keep the data comparable. Hence, only European companies from WVS’s list are included 
into sample. The countries listed by VWS (2014) do not, however, cover all European 
countries, as the table 1 shows. Eikon –platform is the second data source for financial 
statement data. In Eikon searches, the requirements include (1) publicly listed companies, 
(2) companies with other than financial and insurance activities, and (3) companies whose 
headquarters are located in European countries specified in table 1. 
 
In the data analysis, the current period values cover the last 12 months (FY0) while previous 
period covers the earlier 12 months (FY-1). This is because all European companies do not 
have calendar year as their financial year. This research analyses data only during twelve 
months in order to remove the effect of changes in IFRS standards during the years. In 
addition to the information in balance sheet and the statement of profit and loss, also 
industry, country code and company ID information were retrieved from Eikon. The total 
sample includes 3,680 European companies. The table 2 below summarizes the composition 
of the sample. 
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Table 2 - Composition of the sample 
 
Country No. of firms 
  
Denmark 107 
Finland 131 
Norway 132 
Sweden 627 
    
Austria 50 
Belgium 94 
France 504 
Germany 428 
Great Brittain 907 
Ireland 52 
Netherlands 119 
    
Greece 121 
Italy 213 
Portugal 37 
Spain 158 
  
Total 3,680 
 
 
The sample consists of all European publicly listed companies that meet the locational 
criteria in Eikon platform. All companies with financial services industries were removed 
from the sample to ensure that the different balance sheet structure will not distort the results 
of the analysis. Hence, the sample contains 3,680 companies. Sample includes companies 
operating together in 18 industries. The table 3 below shows the industry distribution of the 
sample. Industry “K” is the one referring to financial services, and therefore it is missing 
from the table. 
 
Table 3 - Industry distribution of the sample 
 
Industry 
variable Description No. of firms % of sample 
industry_a Agriculture, forestry and fishing 32 1 % 
industry_b Mining and quarrying 141 4 % 
industry_c Manufacturing 1455 40 % 
industry_d Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 81 2 % 
industry_e Water supply; sewerage, waste management and 
remediation activities 25 1 % 
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industry_f Construction 105 3 % 
industry_g 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles 
and motorcycles 297 8 % 
industry_h 
 Transportation and storage 114 3 % 
industry_i 
Accommodation and food service activities 64 2 % 
industry_j 
Information and communication 515 14 % 
industry_l 
Real estate activities 220 6 % 
industry_m 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 246 7 % 
industry_n 
Administrative and support service activities 126 3 % 
industry_o 
Public administration and defence; compulsory social 
security 8 0 % 
industry_p Education 11 0 % 
industry_q 
Human health and social work activities 71 2 % 
industry_r 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 69 2 % 
industry_s 
Other service activities 100 3 % 
Total   3,680 100 % 
 
 
3.3 Regression model  
 
This study uses regression analysis to measure the effect of each variable on abnormal 
working capital accruals. The regression equation is presented below. 
 
𝑎𝑏𝑠_𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡_𝑝𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑠𝑡_𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑦 + 𝛽3 ∗ ln _𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 + 𝛽4 ∗
𝐿𝐸𝑉 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑑_𝐶𝐹𝑂 + 𝛽6 ∗ ln _𝑓𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽7 ∗ IND     (6) 
 
where: 
 
abs_AWCA = absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals in current year; 
trust_people = country-specific variable for generalized trust; 
trust_company = country-specific variable for company trust; 
ln_revenue = the natural logarithm of the firm revenue in current year; 
LEV = liabilities and debt divided by total assets in current year; 
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scaled_CFO = cash flow from operations in current year scaled with total assets in previous 
year; 
ln_fee = the natural logarithm of the auditor’s fee in current year; 
IND = industry variables (total 18) receiving a binary variable that is assigned a value of 0 
or 1. 
 
 
3.4 Variable selection 
 
The table 4 separates and describes the outcome variable, hypothesis variables and control 
variables. All the variables are justified below the table. 
 
Table 4 – Variables 
 
Outcome variable   Description 
    
Earnings management Absolute value of abnormal working capital accruals 
    
 
Hypothesis variables   
    
Generalized trust  Country-specific variable determined by WVS (2014) 
    
Company trust  Country-specific variable determined by WVS (2014) 
    
 
Control variables     
    
Size   Natural logarithm of the firm's revenue 
    
Leverage   The ratio between total liabilities and total assets 
    
Cash flow from operations Cash flow from operations scaled by total assets 
    
Auditor's fee  Natural logarithm of auditor's fee 
    
Industry dummy  A binary variable that is assigned a value of 0 or 1. 
 
 
AWCA 
As discussed in the end of chapter 2, the DeFond and Park model is used to calculate 
abnormal working capital accruals for each company. Also the motivation for using this 
specific model is discussed in chapter 2. The larger the AWCA value is, the more company 
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manages its earnings. Positive value indicates that company aims to increase its current 
period earnings with accruals, while negative AWCA means that accruals are used to make 
current period earnings seem lower than what they actually are. However, in this research 
the direction of the earnings management is not relevant as only the existence of the 
relationship between AWCA and trust variables is being examined. Hence, only the absolute 
value of AWCA is being examined. 
 
𝐴𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖𝑡 =
𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡  −  [(
𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡−1
𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡−1
)  ∗  𝑅𝐸𝑉𝑖𝑡]
𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑡−1
 
 
In order to use this model, the following information was retrieved using Eikon platform: 
 
WCit = Working capital excluding cash in current period; 
WCit-1 = Working capital excluding cash in previous period; 
REVit = Revenue in current period; 
REVit-1 = Revenue in previous period; 
tait-1 = Total assets in previous period. 
 
Working capital excluding cash is calculated as follows:  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 =  𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 –  𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ & 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 –  𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠  
 
Generalized trust and company trust 
Trust variables serve as hypothesis variables in the analysis, since they give answers to the 
research question. As discussed in the beginning of this chapter, generalized trust indicates 
to what extent people trust each other in a society. Company trust describes the level of 
confidence people have in companies in their society. These variables are country-specific, 
and are determined by World Values Survey (2014). 
 
Control variables 
In previous researches (see Rathke et al. 2016), size significantly associated with the level 
of discretionary accruals, which is why natural logarithm of revenue was selected to be a 
control variable. CFO and leverage (scaled_CFO and LEV) are added in regression, since 
low cash flow or high leverage of a firm could be a motive for earnings management. 
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Auditor’s fee has found to be positively correlated with earnings management in previous 
researches (see e.g. Kenchel et al. 2018), which is why it is included in control variables. 
Finally, industry was selected as variable to control the earnings management in different 
industries.  
 
 
3.5 Reliability and validity of data and method  
 
Reliability of the research data is considered to be sufficient, since only reliable data sources 
are used. World Values Survey is a global network of social scientists, led by an international 
team of scholars, with the WVS Association WVSA Secretariat headquartered in Vienna, 
Austria. General trust values are used in previous earnings management researches as well, 
which makes this study comparable. Eikon is an international, widely used financial 
information service with an access to global, daily updated information, and the information 
retrieved using that platform is considered to be reliable.  
 
This research uses appropriate and widely used method in measuring earnings management. 
DeFond and Park model (2001) measures effectively the level and direction of earnings 
management, while the exact value of earnings management is less significant in this 
research. This is because only the existence of the relationship between trust variables and 
earnings management is studied. DeFond and Park (2001) method allows larger sample size, 
because it uses data that is easily accessible in general databases. Rove (2017) found DeFond 
& Park model to be the most effective one to measure earnings management in Finnish 
context. As data for DeFond and Park model is easily accessible and the model measures 
what it is supposed to, one can argue that the selected research method for this study is valid.  
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4 Results  
 
This chapter presents the results of this research. The descriptive statistics as well as 
empirical results from the regression model are introduced. Chapter 4 also discusses whether 
the results support the literature review findings, and whether the results were expected or 
unexpected. 
 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
 
Table 5 below presents descriptive statistics of the sample divided into three groups. A total 
of 1,757 companies received values for each variable. The statistics are grouped based on 
the company location. Nordic countries include Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland. 
Central Europe group consists of Netherlands, Germany, Ireland, Austria, Belgium, United 
Kingdom and France. Southern Europe covers the rest of the countries; Italy, Spain, Greece 
and Portugal. The descriptive statistics of the sample without the breakdown is presented in 
table 6. 
 
As the table 5 shows, the median of abnormal working capital accruals somewhat varies 
between Nordic countries, Central Europe and Southern Europe. The median of AWCA in 
Southern Europe is 20% smaller than it is in Nordic countries, however, the differences in 
medians are not significant. This difference could indicate that in Southern Europe, less 
abnormal working capital accruals are used to manage earnings. However, the sample 
contains clearly more Nordic companies than Southern European companies, which could 
distort the results. 
 
People trust (generalized trust) and company trust numbers are country-specific, as shown 
in the table 3.1 in previous chapter.  Generalized and company trust levels are both higher 
in Nordic countries compared to Central and Southern Europe. This is in line with the 
findings of Olivera (2015), who document higher level trust in Nordic countries compared 
to other European countries. 
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The median of leverage also varies between companies from different parts in Europe. The 
table 5 shows that the mean of LEV between total liabilities and total assets for Nordic 
country companies is 0.499, while the ratio for Central European companies is 0.591 and 
Southern European firms 0.604. It is generally thought that Nordic companies rather avoid 
risks, while Southern European companies are more open to risk-taking (Rego and Wilson, 
2012). However, the values for CFO, revenue and audit fee do not significantly vary between 
different areas in Europe.  
 
Table 5 – Group-specific descriptive statistics 
 
Variable 
Nordic countries Central Europe Southern Europe 
Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
          
abs_ABNACR 0.065 0.029 0.120 0.060 0.028 0.112 0.048 0.023 0.086 
scaled_CFO 0.058 0.078 0.255 0.047 0.074 0.220 0.071 0.072 0.089 
ln_revenue 12.258 12.453 2.383 12.712 12.784 2.511 13.186 13.301 1.928 
ln_fee 5.672 5.557 1.363 6.135 5.904 1.573 6.098 5.927 1.475 
trust_people 0.692 0.670 0.049 0.362 0.350 0.086 0.266 0.300 0.042 
trust_company 0.683 0.670 0.048 0.566 0.570 0.026 0.484 0.500 0.031 
LEV 0.499 0.524 0.204 0.591 0.527 1.247 0.604 0.613 0.217 
          
Observations     375     1,180     202 
 
The descriptive statistics without the grouping are presented in table 6 below. The statistics 
reveal that the natural logarithm of revenue and audit fee as well as the leverage vary the 
most as their standards deviations are the largest. This is natural since the base values of 
these variables vary strongly between the firms. 
 
Table 6 - Descriptive Statistics of the total sample 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
abs_AWCA 0.087 0.033 0.162 0.000 1.000 
Results 33  
 
 
scaled_CFO 0.052 0.074 0.217 -2.822 2.403 
ln_revenue 11.304 11.446 2.993 -2.287 19.355 
ln_fee 6.032 5.841 1.530 -1.022 12.139 
trust_people 0.427 0.350 0.176 0.170 0.760 
trust_company 0.581 0.570 0.079 0.350 0.780 
LEV 0.573 0.535 1.030 0.002 36.134 
      
Total observations       1,757 
 
 
Table 7 shows correlations between independent variables, since the logistic regression does 
not explain the interactions between single variables. A star (*) indicates that the correlation 
is significant at one percent level.  
 
The correlation analysis shows a strong correlation between scaled operating cash flow and 
natural logarithm of revenue. This indicates that companies with larger revenue have more 
likely bigger operating cash flow. Even more significant correlation seems to exist between 
revenue and audit fees. This is expected, since audit fees are usually tied to a firm’s size, 
that is, level of revenue. 
 
Another strong – but expected - correlation lies between people trust and company trust. 
These numbers change mostly together, and a society with high people trust index is more 
likely to have a high company trust as well. On the other hand, in societies where people 
cannot be trusted, companies are probably experiencing the lack of trust too. 
 
There is an interesting and surprisingly low correlation between leverage and audit fee. One 
could assume that the more debt a firm has, the bigger would its audit fee be. All in all, the 
correlation is positive, which indicates that the more leverage the company has, the larger 
the audit fee is. This is in line with a thought that investors value the auditors’ work 
especially in companies with large amounts of debt. 
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Table 7 – Correlations of independent variables 
 
Variable scaled_CFO ln_revenue ln_fee trust_people trust_company LEV 
       
scaled_CFO   0.362* 0.155* 0.030 -0.005 -0.123* 
ln_revenue 0.362*   0.807* -0.045 -0.068 -0.013 
ln_fee 0.155* 0.807*   -0.071 -0.036 0.020 
trust_people 0.030 -0.045 -0.071   0.843* -0.028 
trust_company -0.005 -0.068 -0.036 0.843*   -0.043 
LEV -0.123* -0.013 0.020 -0.028 -0.043   
              
 
Note: The star (*) means significance at a 1% level 
 
4.3 Regression model results 
 
The first column in table 8 presents the coefficient for each independent variable. Coefficient 
estimates show the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent 
variable. These values represent the change in predicted variable when the predictor would 
change by one unit, holding all other predictors constant. The second and third columns 
show z- and p-values, which are used to determine the statistical significance of the results. 
P-value varies between 0 and 1. The smaller the value is, the more likely can the correlation 
be generalized to the population. Hence, a smaller p-value indicates stronger evidence 
against the null hypothesis, and it is more statistically significant. 
 
In this research, a 95% confidence level is used. Confidence level quantifies the level of 
confidence that the parameter lies in the interval. With a 95% confidence level, a variable is 
statistically significant if it gets a p-value smaller than 0.05 (5%). The greatly deviating 
values are removed from the data before the tests as the deviations in scatter plot are 
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problematic when using the correlation coefficient. Table 8 below presents the estimates of 
the regression model. 
 
Table 8 - Estimates of logistic regression 
 
Variable Coefficients Standard Error P-value Significance 
     
ln_fee 0.001 0.003 0.694  
ln_revenue -0.009 0.002 0.000 * 
trust_people 0.055 0.030 0.060  
trust_company -0.082 0.072 0.252   
LEV 0.022 0.008 0.006 * 
scaled_CFO -0.094 0.014 0.000 * 
industry_a 0.028 0.028 0.313  
industry_b 0.016 0.014 0.243   
industry_c 0.004 0.006 0.484  
industry_d -0.010 0.016 0.557   
industry_e -0.018 0.030 0.556  
industry_f -0.002 0.017 0.908   
industry_g -0.002 0.010 0.822  
industry_h -0.034 0.014 0.012 * 
industry_i -0.036 0.019 0.055  
industry_j -0.001 0.008 0.876   
industry_l 0.196 0.037 0.000 * 
industry_m 0.000 0.011 0.964   
industry_n 0.005 0.015 0.733  
industry_o 0.000 0.055 1.000   
industry_p -0.049 0.110 0.654  
industry_q -0.020 0.024 0.402   
industry_r -0.001 0.020 0.946  
industry_s -0.007 0.042 0.876   
     
Multiple R 0.293    
Adjusted R Square 8.3 %    
Observations 1,749       
 
Note: A star (*) indicates significance at 5% level 
 
The adjusted R Square is only 8.25%. Therefore, another test was made by removing those 
variables that least explained the absolute amount of abnormal working capital accruals. The 
variable trust_company is one of those variables. The results from the second test are 
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presented in table 9 below. In the second test, the coefficient of determination is slightly 
higher, 9.68%. However, the hypothesis variable trust_people is still not statistically 
significant. 
 
Table 9 – Adjusted estimates 
 
Variable Coefficients Standard Error P-value Significance 
     
ln_revenue -0.007 0.001 0.000 * 
trust_people 0.030 0.016 0.051   
LEV 0.023 0.008 0.004 * 
scaled_CFO -0.095 0.013 0.000 * 
industry_l 0.178 0.035 0.000 * 
industry_h -0.025 0.013 0.054   
     
Multiple R 0.316    
Adjusted R Square 9.7 %    
Observations 1,749       
 
Note: A star (*) indicates significance at 5% level 
 
 
4.4 Analysis of the results  
 
The regression analysis in chapter 4.3 gives partly unexpected results. The revenue, leverage 
and operating cash flow in table 8 are statistically significant as expected. Also the 
transportation and storage industry (H) as well as the real estate activities (L) seem to be 
statistically significant. However, audit fee is not statistically significant, even though it is 
shown to be associated with earnings management in previous researches. Most importantly, 
company trust and people trust are not statistically significant, which is unexpected.  
 
The Adjusted R Square (the coefficient of determination) remains small for both tests, which 
could in first test be explained by the large number of variables that are not statistically 
significant. Some challenges in analysis process were also caused by companies that did not 
get a value for each variable, because that decreased the sample size of the research. 
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It is expected that CFO and leverage of a company affect the abnormal working capital 
accruals. Revenue and CFO are strongly correlated, since a larger firm is more likely to have 
a bigger operating cash flow. Further, as the firm size increases, it reports more accruals in 
general. Leverage is the ratio between firm’s total liabilities and total assets. As said, the 
increased leverage indicates increased amount of debt the company has. It is not unexpected 
that a firm with large debts would have an incentive to report abnormal working capital 
accruals, that is, manage its earnings. Also previous researches (see e.g. Dechow et al., 1995) 
document a positive relationship between leverage and earnings management. 
 
Audit fee is not statistically significant in the tests. This is unexpected as according to 
previous researches (see e.g. Knechel et al. 2018), audit fees are related to a firm’s earnings 
management. Moreover, correlation analysis shows strong correlation between the revenue 
and audit fee. As revenue is statistically significant, one could expect the audit fee to affect 
abnormal working capital accruals too.  
 
The transportation and storage industry (H) as well as the real estate activities (L) are 
statistically significant in the first test. One could ask: why these two? The previous literature 
does not widely cover industry-specific earnings management in Europe. However, Chen et 
al. (2011) studied discretionary accruals in Chinese real estate companies. They find that 
listed real estate companies have an incentive to manage earnings. This is in line with the 
statistical significance of the real estate industry variable, but only if the results can be 
generalized in the context of Europe. Transportation and storage –industry’s significance, 
on the other hand, does not get any support from previous literature. 
 
In the second test, trust_people variable is not far from being statistically significant at 5% 
level as its p-value is 0.058. Generalized trust has been used in previous earnings 
management literature. As discussed in chapter 2, Nanda and Wysocki (2013), for instance, 
found trust to be negatively associated with earnings management. In addition, previous 
researches (see e.g. Knechel et al. 2018) find a positive relationship between generalized 
trust and audit fees. This research does not show similar results, since according to the 
correlation analysis in table 7, people trust and audit fee are not correlated. 
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5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter concludes the significance of the findings. The objectives of this research are 
compared to the empirical results, after which the conclusions related to the hypothesis are 
presented. Chapter 5 discusses the contributions of this research to the earnings management 
literature, and raises some limitations that are subject to this study. Finally, suggestions for 
further research are discussed.  
 
 
5.1 Summary 
 
The objective of this research is to found out whether the trust affects the earnings 
management in European context. The previous earnings management and cultural variable 
literature is discussed to find out relevant variables affecting the earnings management. 
Earnings management models are introduced, and DeFond & Park model is selected to be 
used in this research to calculate the abnormal working capital accruals.  
 
The earlier studies measuring trust and earnings management are either focused on American 
samples, or are mixing data from Europe and other continents. However, most of the 
previous studies have used logistic regression analysis like this research when performing 
the tests. As the method and the phenomenon studied are similar, the comparison between 
this research and previous literature is possible. 
  
The sample size in in this research is 3,680 companies. This includes all European listed 
IFRS companies, which meet the locational and industrial criteria stated in chapter 3. The 
financial statement data is from the last twelve months, because the financial years vary 
between different companies. The results from the regression analysis are presented in 
chapter 4. The results are found to be partly unexpected as they are not fully supported by 
previous literature.  
 
Further, the empirical tests are completed in chapter 4. Tables 5, 6 and 7 present the analysis 
of independent variables. The hypothesis variables are people trust and company trust, and 
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they answer to the question: Does trust have an effect on earnings management? As 
discussed in chapter 2, the hypothesis assumes that trust is related to a firm’s earnings 
management. 
 
 
5.2 Conclusions of the findings 
 
The hypothesis assumes that generalized trust and/or company trust are related to a firm’s 
reported abnormal working capital accruals. However, as the results show, neither of the 
trust variables are significant in regression analysis. Therefore, the hypothesis stated in this 
research is rejected, and the level of trust in a society does not affect the earnings 
management in European companies. These results are unexpected as previous literature 
(Nanda and Wysocki, 2013) finds trust in a society to correlate with the quality of reporting, 
and further earnings management. 
 
This research is completed on the basis of previous researches that were made in different 
context. There are great differences in accounting standards between IFRS and US GAAP 
for example, which may or may not have affected the results of this research compared to 
other researches. The data source was selected according to the target countries of the 
sample, since not all databases provide financial information of European companies. Also, 
the selected DeFond & Park model may affect the results, because some previous studies 
use alternative methods. All in all, there are several reasons behind the received results. 
 
IFRS-standards have probably unified the reporting of listed companies to the extent that the 
amount of abnormal working capital accruals is smaller. Moreover, the European countries 
may have become more homogeneous, and no major differences in firms’ abnormal working 
capital accruals, or financial reporting strategies in general, exist. This fact is supported by 
the fact that as the table 5 in chapter 4 shows, the trust variables vary more within Europe 
than the abnormal working capital accruals. This further confirms the result that in Europe, 
the generalized trust and company trust do not have an effect on earnings management. 
 
The first contribution to the earnings management literature is that this research examines 
the effect of trust only in European context, which has not been done before. The results 
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show that trust (people or company trust) does not have an effect on earnings management 
of the companies. Secondly, audit fee, which is commonly used as a variable when testing 
earnings management, does not apply in the context of Europe. 
 
Results are significant in everyday life. Investors are able to rely on the fact that even the 
level of trust varies to the large extent between European countries, abnormal working 
capital accruals do not vary as much. Hence, the companies located in lower trust countries 
may be now considered more reliable. This could even lead to the situation where the trust 
in companies located in lower trust countries rises, and eventually the differences in trust 
levels within Europe decrease. 
 
 
5.3 Limitations and suggestions for further research  
 
The findings of this research represent only the companies reporting IFRS financial 
statements. The scope covers only European listed companies operating on other than 
financial and insurance industry from the last twelve months. Another data base or country 
selection could have given different results. Moreover, the selected earnings management 
model strongly affects to the results. The outcome could be different if other than DeFond 
& Park model was used. The control variables used in this study are based on previous 
researches, and a different variables selection could give dissimilar results. 
 
Further research is needed in this field, for example, to examine whether another earnings 
management model would give different results and better coefficient of determination for 
regression analysis. This study could be continued also by selecting different control 
variables to be used in the tests. If a new trust-level research is carried out by World Values 
Survey, more European countries could be included in the study.  
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